Abstract: This thesis aims at consensus-building on citations in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems. Citations, a source of various quantitative measures for intellectual products (e.g., scientific publications, patents, web pages), are more robust and productive if autonomous peers in a P2P system can determine and construct their true structure. However, this consensus-building has remained unreliable due to three problems that preceding studies have not addressed simultaneously: free-riding, strategic misreporting, and reviewer assignment. Therefore, we combined random walks on graphs with peer prediction methods and proposed two incentive mechanisms (ex-ante and ex-post consensus) that reward reviewers who participated in consensus-building. Experimental studies support the usefulness of the two incentive mechanisms for all three problems, by showing that peers can (i) be reviewers more often as they get higher PageRank scores and (ii) maximize the expected rewards per review by always reporting true beliefs. Our proposal—rewards from the consensus-building on citation relationships—also contributes to open-access intellectual products as an alternative scheme to grants, royalties, and advertisements. On the other hand, potential applications require future studies to prevent spamming and Sybil attacks and make the reward a sufficient incentive.
Abstract: Our study provides a survey on how existing stablecoins—cryptocurrencies aiming at price stabilization—peg their value to other assets, from the perspective of Decentralized Payment Systems (DPSs). This attempt is important because there has been no preceding surveys focusing on the stablecoin as DPSs, i.e., the one aiming at not only price stabilization but also decentralization. For clarity, we first classified existing stablecoins into four types according to their collaterals (fiat, commodity, crypto, and non-collateralized) and pointed out the high potential of non-collateralized stablecoins as DPSs; then, we further classified existing non-collateralized stablecoins into two types according to their intervention layers (protocol, application) and confirmed details of their representative mechanisms. Utilizing concepts such as Quantity Theory of Money (QTM), Tobin tax, and speculative attack, our survey revealed the status quo where, despite the high potential of non-collateralized stablecoins, they have no standard mechanism to achieve the stablecoin for practical DPSs.
Abstract: In this study, we aim to incorporate the expertise of anonymous curators into a token-curated registry (TCR), a decentralized recommender system for collecting a list of high-quality content. This registry is important, because previous studies on TCRs have not specifically focused on technical content, such as academic papers and patents, whose effective curation requires expertise in relevant fields. To measure expertise, curation in our model focuses on both the content and its citation relationships, for which curator assignment uses the Personalized PageRank (PPR) algorithm while reward computation uses a multi-task peer-prediction mechanism. Our proposed CitedTCR bridges the literature on network-based and token-based recommender systems and contributes to the autonomous development of an evolving citation graph for high-quality content. Moreover, we experimentally confirm the incentive for registration and curation in CitedTCR using the simplification of a one-to-one correspondence between users and content (nodes).
Abstract: This chapter critically investigates the application of blockchain technology for intellectual property management. To date, there have been relatively few critical discussions of the feasibility of utilising blockchain technology for this purpose, although much has been written, in media and industry sources, about the potential. Our aim, by contrast, is to examine possible limitations—and, subsequently, to suggest tentative solutions to the limitations we identify. Specifically, this chapter aims to examine the use of blockchain technology for intellectual property management from two perspectives: operation and implementation. We conclude that, while commentators often focus on technical characteristics of blockchain technology itself, it is the incentive design—which was fundamental to the original Bitcoin proposal—that is also critical to truly decentralised, and disintermediated, intellectual property management.